A Rough Climate for Migration

Elaine Kelly

“Understanding climate change as a security issue risks making it a military rather than foreign policy problem and a sovereignty rather than global commons problem.” (Barnett, 2003, p.14)

“This is the double law of hospitality: to calculate the risks, yes, but without closing the door on the incalculable, that is, on the future and the foreigner. It defines the unstable site of strategy and decision.” (Derrida, 2005, p. 6)

INTRODUCTION

In 2010, writer and director Michael Nash released a film detailing the impact of climate change and environmental degradation in terms of mass migration. Nash’s film, titled Climate Refugees has since gone around the world, gaining official selection into countless film festivals. According to information contained on the official website http://www.climaterefugees.com, the film has made its way across much of the United States, presumably in an effort to educate Americans about the global nature of climate change as well as possible impacts at a domestic level with regard to displacement and migration. A call for political action, the film places emphasis on the negative implications of neglecting climate issues, casting this in terms of threats to national security. Given its dominant market (so far), its cover imagery of the U.S. and South America across a face, and its inclusion of prominent American academics, scientists and politicians, such as Al Gore, Paul Ehrlich and Lester Brown, it is not unreasonable to assume that U.S. national security is an important theme of the film. In fact, approximately two minutes into ‘Trailer Two’ is the following quote from Navy Vice Admiral Lee F. Gunn:

---

1 Elaine Kelly is Chancellor’s Postdoctoral Candidate at the University of Technology, Sydney, Australia. Her work examines the political, ethical and scientific issues associated with the climate-migration nexus. She is particularly interested in the works of Jacques Derrida and the concept of hospitality in the context of climate-migration. She can be reached at: Elaine.Kelly@uts.edu.au
Addressing the changes in the Earth’s climate is not simply about saving polar bears and preserving the beauty of the mountain glaciers. Climate Change is a threat to our national security.

“Climate Change is a threat to our national security”. Such a statement reveals some potentially important implications for policy directions in relation to international or cross-border climate-induced migration. An issue that has no formal recognition or (inter)national structures\(^2\), environmental migration remains in a policy vacuum. This leaves it open to be being absorbed by a security platform. Thus the contention of this paper is that if work is not done to assert an ethical foundation for responding to climate-induced migration, law and policy will be dominated (in and for the Global North) by a national security paradigm. This is already an emerging trend with countries such as Australia deploying the Navy in ‘deter and deny’ migration strategies, and the US drawing heavily upon the military following the devastating earthquake in Haiti in 2010, an example I will return to later in this paper.

While the nation-state is usually assumed in security studies to be the bedrock for stability, I argue that it can be viewed as an active agent in producing insecurity when we examine the North-South divide and the ways in which in the Global North disaster narratives promote apocalyptic visions of environmental migration which in turn perpetuate racialised discourses of invasion and fear. For instance, one article warns of the 50 million environmental refugees who are set to “flood the global north by 2020” (SMH, 2011) or another which reports that ‘Mexican “climate migrants” predicted to flood US’ (naturenews, 2011). This nightmarish narrative functions in the Global North to stall policy development, while in the Global South many states continue to deal with the reality of regional and internal mass migration. Against the logic that posits this as a regional problem, I agree with Warner et al., who argue that solutions must be thought through at a global level (Warner et al, 2009).

From here, I consider the privileged nation-state as bound up with the production of insecurity in numerous ways. Firstly, in relation to the ongoing complicity of many privileged states in the emission of the

\(^2\) Legal scholarship on climate refugees and environmental migration is available, but has not been put into action by the international community at present. See: Bierman and Boas, 2008; Warner et al., 2009. Moreover there is a debate amongst legal scholars as to what mechanism and definitional system would be most appropriate. This paper is concerned with the dominance of national securisation and the impact of having no protective framework rather than with outlining the positions within this debate.
very pollutants that contribute to environmental and climate displacement and migration. In 2007, Namibian’s representative to the United Nations, Kaire Mbuende, reportedly referred to the continued levels of Greenhouse Gas Emissions by developed nations as equivalent to “low intensity biological and chemical warfare” (cited in Brown et al., 2007, p. 1142). Secondly, in relation to the policing of borders and the militaristic management of ‘mass migration’ and, thirdly, in reference to the ways in which these more dominant states may override another state’s sovereignty or decision-making capacity in the event of natural disaster (or in the future, climate change disaster). This shifts the discourse away from positioning the privileged nation-state as a potential victim, in the position of impeding insecurity from waves and floods of migration, and toward an understanding of its active role in sustaining the conditions of instability and indeed insecurity for vulnerable states and populations. Throughout, I shift between examples of more broadly understood environmental disaster such as the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and more specific climate change issues. This shifting is not to be understood as a conflation of environmental disasters with climate-related events. Rather, Haiti is drawn upon because it exemplifies the manner in which existing policy patterns toward specific forms of migration will contribute to, if not determine, potential responses to climate-related disasters in the future. Moreover, because the effects of climate change on migration are difficult to determine in advance, it is useful to “use past and current experiences as analogous” (Tacoli, 2009, p. 517).

By calling into question the logic of security at play, this paper attempts to disrupt the dominant political vocabulary of national security and securitisation more generally in relation to matters of migration and climate. Securitisation refers to the Copenhagen School’s paradigm which regards security as the “social practice” of constructing an issue as a threat (Trombetta, 2008, p. 588). This in turn permits the suspension of the normal order of things and the deployment of a “‘decisionist’ attitude which emphasizes the importance of reactive emergency measures” (Trombetta, 2008, p. 588). Heeding Mark Neocleous’ call for an “alternative political language” to contend with the dominance of securitisation (Neocleous, 2008, p. 186), I present the concept of hospitality as one way that we may be able to ethically engage with and prepare for climate-induced migration; to engage at the “unstable site of strategy and decision” (Derrida, 2005, p. 6) without shutting out the foreigner or reducing politics to the identification of enemies, as in Schmitt’s logic.3 Derrida’s

double law of hospitality refers to the notion that a fundamental unconditional openness must negotiate with the imperative to condition gestures of hospitality via programmes, rights discourse, and other policies, and vice versa, that the latter cannot be closed off. Using Derrida I argue that the concept of hospitality provides us with greater scope for ethical engagement with the issue. In so doing, I compare the mobilisation of the military by the US following the earthquake in Haiti to the gesture of radical hospitality put forth by Senegal President Abdoulaye Wade. Rather than bracketing ‘hospitality’ off as a utopian or unrealistic ideal, I argue that it must contest the political vocabularies that constitute the climate-security discourse.

SECURITISING CLIMATE-MIGRATION

Literature dealing with issues of security tends to be interdisciplinary in scope and thus encompasses a wide range of approaches. It is consequently impossible to generalise about the ‘field’. A dominant area of research however concerns national security which is, according to Lester Brown, “as old as the nation-state” itself, but took on greater significance post-WWII when it was reduced, from this period until the end of the Cold War, to military might with a “policy of continual preparedness” (Brown, 1977, p. 4). Underpinning the operation of national security is a belief that the political and economic structures of the nation-state provide stability and protection, and that threats external may undermine this (traditionally this specified war/military threats). Before I get to an analysis of the potential response to climate migration to the Global North, it seems imperative to outline and analyse the ways in which security is tied to the nation-state and the development of this field to encompass the environment, migration and more recently, climate change. This discussion is important in order to contextualise issues of migration and demonstrates the dominance of the security model when discussing the environment and climate change.

Lester Brown’s foundational piece, Redefining National Security (1977), marks a discursive shift away from national security as a military issue and toward understanding the relationship between man and nature in terms of security. Brown outlines the environmental basis of much polit-

---

4 Anthropocentric climate change has and will continue to result in the increased frequency, duration and force of harsh weather events (storms, hurricanes and droughts for example), as well as rising sea levels. Such events occur in addition to more broadly understood environmental problems such as desertification, soil erosion, resource depletion, an expanding population and natural disasters such as earthquakes.
ical conflict, the importance of energy and resources, and the manner in which the economy is dependent upon the biosphere for its raw materials. It stands to reason then that if domestic political and economic stability is the objective of national security imperatives, the environment would need to be accommodated under such an umbrella. Brown concludes that “the purpose of national security deliberations should not be to maximize military strength but to maximize national security” (Brown, 1977, p. 37). Over fifteen years later, Joseph J. Romm likewise notes that the broadening of security outside of traditional military concerns and into areas like the environment witnesses the diminishing import of military security (Romm, 1993, p.1). In this sense, widening the concept acknowledges the diversity of issues that may impact the nation-state’s sense of well-being as well as the variety of possible ways of responding to problems. Theoretically, ‘human security’ goes a step further, shifting the emphasis away from the state and toward the individual.\(^5\)

However, even as the discourse of security is now recognisable in discussions outside of traditional military concerns, the alignment of the environment as a defence issue has become increasingly apparent. As Richard A. Matthew tells us, while many, especially environmentalists, saw the defence industry as inextricably bound up with the problems of ecological disaster, the environment soon emerged as an aspect of national security and, from the 1980s onward in the United States, continued to be included in its agenda (Matthew, 2000, p. 105). Despite some reservations on the left side of political activism, many fought for the inclusion of environmentalism in the national security policy domain (Matthews, 2000, p. 107). With this move, Matthew marks precisely what is at stake: while inclusion may have initially been desired as a result of a fear that without any recognition of the problem at a national level the response would be one of neglect and continued environmental degradation, the contemporary context reveals to us the costs of such inclusion. In the decision to include environmental security into its defence agenda, a large range of economic, social and political issues could now be interpreted utilising the rubric of defence and the apparatus of the military.

---

\(^5\) Roland Paris’ much cited text “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air” (2001), suggests that the umbrella term human security is too broad to assist policy makers or academic researchers alike. In a different manner, Migel De Larrinaga and Marc G. Doucet in “Sovereign Power and the biopolitics of human security” (2008), argue that the paradigm of human security extends the reach of sovereign and biopolitical modalities of power. In this sense, taking an approach popularised by Giorgio Agamben they contend that human security is simply another means via which sovereign power takes hold of life.
Drawing diverse issues under the same umbrella of securitisation has the effect of, as Jef Huysmans notes regarding migration, determining the operation of the political as the identification of an “existential” threat, in the tradition of politics handed down since Schmitt (Huysmans, 2006, p. 126). Across the Global North—for instance, in the EU, Australia, and the US—unexpected migration has witnessed the deployment of the military, something which United States Naval War College Associate Professor Paul Smith writes, “partially reflects a paradigm shift in how international migration is being considered. What was once a social or labor issue has now transformed often into a security matter” (Smith, 2007, p. 628). Following this, Smith argues that while this may present a workable short-term solution for the ‘host’ state, in the long-term, states must confront the “dilemma” of “how to accommodate the predicated surge in environmental migrants” (Smith, 2007, p. 633).

The dominance of the security paradigm can be seen in recent efforts to lock down a concept of climate security which can then be effectively mobilised by policymakers, extending its reach from environmental and migration discourse into climate change. Steen Nordstrom has suggested that even though climate change is an “odd security problem to address” (Nordstrom, 2010, p. 6), because it is a “threat multiplier” it needs to be more tightly tied to national security and multilateral discussion forums (Nordstrom, 2010, p. 9). Again the language of threat dominates. Because migration is a knock-on or one of the threats multiplied by unstable climatic conditions, one can only assume then that it should be subsumed under the umbrella of national security. Indeed, Joshua W. Busby has contended that the “spillover from neighbours” may in turn require “military mobilization to contain the population movement or provide essential services” (Busby, 2008, p. 477). In the following section, this blurring of humanitarian aid and military mission in the interests of national security will be discussed.

Marie Julia Trombetta recognises the difficulty of implementing climate security, arguing that its complexity arises in the paradoxical need to both transform and protect “the existing economic structure and way of life” (Trombetta, 2008, p. 591). While environmental security takes account of the entire biosphere, climate security concerns the “maintenance of stable climatic conditions as a prerequisite of all human enterprises” (Trombetta, 2008, p. 595). The ambition to secure stable climatic conditions is central to the issues of displacement and migration.

---

6 Smith (2007, p.628) notes that the EU’s border protection agency, Frontex, utilises the military regularly.
which arise when climatic conditions are destabilised and chaotic. And yet, the desire to tie political action to a notion of climate security reads ambiguously. How would this be achieved? Normative questions of responsibility arise: if a nation-state has benefited historically from high carbon emissions should it take on more migrants/refugees? How can we weigh this against the host nations own sustainability needs? How can we think through hospitality in this setting? It is at this juncture—of sustainability and social justice—that states need to do ethical work.

Even as the difficulties, paradoxes and oddities of merging climate and security are signposted by academics, the coupling of climate change with security, and thus the association to “potential or real threat” (Liotta, 2005, p. 49) can be seen in the establishment of major government and non-government bodies such as the CIA’s Centre on Climate Change and National Security in late September 2009. Indeed this development builds on what John Tirman has highlighted as the ways in which security discourse has taken a leading role in the administration and regulation of immigration post 9/11 in the US (Tirman, 2006). In addition to the formation of national bodies, the United States Department of Defence Quadrennial Defence Review Report 2010, which provides an overview of the strategic framework for its national defence force, includes the subsection “Creating a Strategic Approach to Climate and Energy”. In this brief section we are told that that climate change, alongside energy, will play a key role “in shaping the future security environment” (p. 84). Taking a holistic approach, the document notes that “climate change, energy security and economic stability are inextricably linked” (p. 84). This echoes Brown, writing almost 40 years earlier, rhetorically tying national security to sustainability (even the defence force is involved in making its operations more ecologically sustainable!). The preservation or defence of the environment and climate is crucial for continued economic prosperity. The conclusion is drawn that the military as well as civil bodies will be required to deal with “instability or conflict” resulting from climate change (p. 85). Interestingly, mass migration is mentioned once - briefly and cautiously—pointing to the possibility that national responses will privilege national security over other possible modes of engagement.

The move toward heightened border protectionism is crucial to scrutinise given the role of such privileged nation-states in the emergence of anthropocentric climate change as well as the uneven burden

---

8 See Paul Smith (2007) for an overview of the various ways in which military security paradigms have been employed against migrants.
the Global South will be dealt in terms of migration (Tacoli, 2009, p. 515). In the context of climate change and migration the apparatus of security extends in two directions: one, it simultaneously, and from afar, contains migratory movements by positing responsibility as a local or regional issue, rather than a global concern, a point reflected in the failure to generate an international definition of a climate and/or environmental migrant or refugee. As Simon Dalby has noted, “spatial strategies of containment” have always been part of security discourse (Dalby, 2002, p. 38). Even as pre-established migration routes suggest a local or regional trajectory, there needs to be a global focus to policy outlook and an appreciation of “mobility...as part of the solution rather than the problem” (Tacoli, 2009, p. 514). Part of this solution needs to be the reintroduction of hospitality into the debate. This would challenge the current practice of “warehousing” refugees, or what U.S Committee for Refugee’s executive director, Levinia Limón, referred to as “coercing people who have fled persecution to live in crowded, destitute and dangerous encampments” (Limón cited in Fernandes, 2007, p. 142). Secondly, as outlined above, in the Global North, securitising migration promotes the deployment of the military in the event of mass migration, setting security against hospitality or ethics, and short-term reactionary politics against long term legislative and policy development.

While there seems to be an acknowledgement of the difficulty yet urgency of defining climate-induced migration, there is little argument over the fact that numbers are increasing (Kalin, 2010, p. 82). According to Norman Myers, a conservative estimate of environmental migrant numbers in the 1990s was 25 million, more than the figure of traditional refugees at the time (Myers, 2002, p. 609). Current figures put this between 50 million and as high as one billion by 2050 (Christian Aid, 2007), with 200 million often repeated (IOM). Many of these migrants come from “impoverished communities” (Myers, 2002, p. 612) where the environment has exceeded its carrying capacity and can no longer sustain life. Scholars indicate that when migration occurs it is usually regionally focused, leaving neighbouring countries in the position of having to negotiate large numbers of new arrivals (Matthews, 1989; Myers, 2002; Ramlogan, 1996; Swain, 1996; Fernandes, 2007; Tacoli, 2009). As Feldman and Hsu have pointed out, it is not simply a matter of chance that the effects of environmental damage, destruction and harm are unevenly distributed.
distributed. They argue that the “distribution of environmental burdens and risks reflects the legacies of racialisation and colonialism” (Feldman & Hsu, 2009, p.199; also see Dalby, 2002).

When the political response by states such as the US, Australia and the European Union to the migration of peoples characterises their movement as illegal through, in the case of climate-induced migration, a failure of recognition, it could be argued that a model of security is reiterated in which racial privileging protects some at the expense of others (Feldman and Hsu 2009, p. 199). Ashok Swain reveals to us the fact that for years marginal peoples have called for an expansion of the concept of refugee beyond the post-WWII definition, which can be viewed as somewhat Eurocentric in nature. Swain informs us that the Organisation of African Unity as well as Central American bodies have lobbied for change and greater inclusion (Swain, 1996, p. 964). More recently, Bangladesh’s finance minister, Abul Maal Abdul Muhith, noted that “The convention on refugees could be revised to protect people. It’s been through other revisions, so this should be possible” (Grant, Randerson and Vidal, 2009). Stalled political action and legal implementation forces us to question the reasons for such reluctance to either re-define refugee or open up new categories of protection. P.H Liotta suggests that when threats are not deemed to be immediate and undeniable the political response is often one of refusal followed by reactive action:

Given the uncertainty, the complexity, and the sheer non-linear unpredictability of creeping vulnerabilities, the frequent–and classic–mistake of the decision maker is to respond with the ‘gut reaction’: the intuitive response to situations of clear ambiguity is, classically, to do nothing at all. The more appropriate response is to take an adaptive posture. (Liotta, 2005, p. 52)

A reactive reaction can be juxtaposed to “an adaptive posture”, which I suggest can be read as one open to the uncertainty inherent to hospitality (unconditional hospitality) while also preparing in advance–adapting–to changing circumstances (conditional hospitality). A security apparatus is mobilised in a reactive manner by Global North states and forecloses or dramatically restricts both a conditional economy of hospitality, and unconditionality. Moreover, in the movement from reaction to adaptation, a ‘threat’ can be re-signified. In this instance, while legal recognition has its limits, a more ethically informed conditional hospitality can be attained which responds to the needs outlined by vulnerable countries.
For the Global North then, the failure (or refusal?) to adapt protocols for protection or regulation leads then to the adoption of military tactics when confronting migration and reproduces a racialised apparatus of security in which privileged states must be protected from potential mass migration, while poorer states are left to deal with growing numbers of displaced peoples. Here I draw again on Feldman and Hsu who understand “racialisation as, in part, a function of differentially distributed vulnerabilities” (Feldman & Hsu, 2009, p. 204). While there is an acknowledgment that some locales are more vulnerable to the impact of climate change, for instance the works of Myers and others brings to light the uneven effects of climate change; legacies of racialisation and colonialism are not fleshed out for their ongoing significance. In fact, the language deployed by Myers in his book *Ultimate Security* re-inscribes the sorts of racial fear invoked more casually in mainstream media. The rhetoric of flooding, spreading and waves, of poverty and destruction, has the effect of portraying such peoples in homogenising ways with the logic of ‘us’ and ‘them’ implicitly apparent. For example, take the following excerpt from Myers:

We could eventually (or soon?) witness multitudes of despair-driven migrants heading from tropical Asia toward “empty” Australia, from China toward Siberia, from Latin America toward North America, and from Africa toward Europe...

The repercussions would be profound. Refugees often arrive with what is perceived by host communities as “unwanted luggage” in the form of alien customs, religious practise, and dietary habits, plus new pathogens and susceptibility to local pathogens. Resettlement is generally difficult, full assimilation is rare. Economic and social dislocations would proliferate, cultural and ethnic problems would multiply, and the political fallout would be extensive if not explosive (Myers, 1993, p. 200-1).

---

10 At the time of writing this paper, a humanitarian catastrophe is occurring in the Horn of Africa, where at least 10 million people are affected by drought with many moving toward large refugee camps in the region. While I cannot do justice to this issue in this paper, the emergency presents us with an example of what Limón refers to as “warehousing”. Near the borders of Ethiopia and Somalia, the Dadaab Camp usually holds 90,000 people at capacity, but currently has 400,000 people with more waiting to be processed. While not all of these people may be requesting resettlement in another country, all are moving because their homelands are at least temporarily unable to nourish them. In response, the British are leading the way with aid packages, pledging firstly £38 million and then another £52.25 million.
Although potentially well-intentioned (as a call for action to mitigate environmental destruction), Myers’ disaster narrative positions the racialised ‘other’ as a bringer of disease, disorder, and incompatible cultural differences which may lead to conflict and political breakdown. The Global North faces invasion by “multitudes of despair-driven migrants”. Dalby expresses this well when he writes that such representational strategies highlight “the modern impulse to control and the medical tropes of endangerment and disease, abnormality and threat” (Dalby, 2002, p. 154). Myers’ scenario negatively overemphasises the risks and dangers of extending hospitality. Such framing is unhelpful to any constructive efforts to understand the necessary and inevitable role that migration and resettlement will play in the future.\footnote{That hospitality is not on the agenda for the Global North is evidenced in the unfolding Horn of Africa humanitarian crisis where emergency aid tops the international agenda (and rightly so), but the possibility of global gestures of hospitality in terms of resettlement is not addressed. While it is undeniably important to restore homelands, to provide funding for infrastructure and local resilience strategies, the plight of hundreds of thousands of peoples demands measures which extend beyond the maintenance of refugee camps.}

From this we can see that from the representational economies perpetuated in media, academic texts and so on, to the positions held by governments, security is privileged over hospitality; they are, in fact, placed in opposition to one another. In this section, I have traced the way in which environmental, migration and climate issues have been included in security debates. These debates have attempted to move beyond the national paradigm.

By introducing a discussion of climate-induced migration, I have suggested that despite this conceptual development, the nation-state continues to hold enormous power over the scope of policymaking with a policy vacuum at the international level in relation to climate and environmentally-induced migration. This in turn reiterates a racialised North-South divide, with the Global South carrying most of the impacts of environmental migration. Finally, I have started to highlight the potential for military models of security to become the norm in privileged states in response to the possibility of environmental and climate-induced disaster migration. In the next section, I will focus on the US response to the Haiti earthquake in 2010 in order to develop this line of argument.
A ROUGH CLIMATE FOR MIGRATION

“Border security—and the ability to decide who comes in and who is excluded—is an essential aspect of state sovereignty.” (Smith, 2007, p. 621)

It has almost become a truism to say that humans have for thousands of years moved in response to climate, either opportunistically or as a result of circumstance (see Carto et al., 2009; McLeman and Smit, 2006). With the system of nation-states firmly established since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, movement has been read through a paradigm of sovereign rights and responsibilities. The logic that Paul Smith expresses—that border security is central to state sovereignty—has been echoed in politics and law with, for instance, the former Australian Prime Minister stating that “[w]e will decide who comes to this country and the conditions in which they come” (Howard, 2001) following an influx of asylum seekers arriving by boat from Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran between 1999 and 2001.12 This mode of politics, one which Barnett—in the quote which opens this paper—refers to as a security paradigm tying military efforts and sovereignty together (Barnett, 2003, p. 14), contains an extremely conditional version of hospitality reliant upon invitations. Barnett contends that a paradigm change is needed in which climate change should be put under the banner of foreign policy and regarded as a global commons concern. What this means is that it must look outward instead of inward; it must understand the nation-state as in-relation with other states and non-state actors. In our current political environment and imagination turning to foreign policy may only confirm the priority of the nation-state even as it demands global engagement and puts into question traditional understandings of responsibility, ownership and sovereignty. While this shift in perspective has potential, its relationship to security discourse needs to be carefully thought through. Part of this demands that we disentangle hospitality from discourses of insecurity and threat.

In ‘The Case against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security’ (1990), Daniel Deudney carefully thinks through the ramifications of linking the environment with security. Writing in response to figures such as Jessica T. Matthews and Lester Brown, Deudney contests the relevance of national security—as concerned with interstate violence—with the environment. There are two other points Deudney highlights that have importance for this paper. Firstly, Deudney points out that national security has traditionally been understood as imposing a form of “organised violence” (Deudney, 1990, p. 462)

12 see Pugliese, 2002; Perera, 2002.
and secondly, nationalism is always coupled with national security. Indeed, Deudney argues that “[n]ational security thinking and action is all premised upon a relatively sharp distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’, between friend and foe” (Deudney, 1990, p. 467). Thus, if we continue to promote a national security approach to climate change and environmental migration, the baggage of nationalism comes along too, with strong racialised distinctions between ‘us’ and ‘them’, between ‘citizen’ and ‘foreigner’, and ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’. Before considering ways in which we can intervene ethically into this complex political issue, ways that break down the reliance on national security, the case of the 2010 Haiti earthquake will be discussed. Is there a form of organised violence functioning in the actions of the US government, despite its humanitarian guise? Is there a nationalistic sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’ evident in the response? What understanding of hospitality does this entail? Is hospitality even possible within security regimes, or do we need an entirely different language?

**Haiti: ‘Compassionate Invasion’?**

A compelling example of the use of a national security paradigm by the US is the event of the Haitian earthquake of January 2010. The response to this crisis provides insights into ways in which climate security across national borders or in the name of defending one’s borders may in the future be militarised. The use of the US defence force for humanitarian aid following natural disaster is not something new. Indeed in 2005, following Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, the US military was deployed to ‘restore order’ and assist with aid, with a ‘public health emergency’ declared, effectively placing New Orleans under martial law. For the American critical theorist, Henry Giroux, Hurricane Katrina revealed a “politics of disposability” in which some US citizens were blatantly “abandoned” by the US government (Giroux, 2006, p. 180). This systematic neglect, according to Giroux, reflected larger racial and class divides in America, which came to determine a differential response in the event of disaster.

The case of Haiti takes on several additional troubling dimensions. Although I am not focusing on the biopolitical dimensions of national security, it is possible to adjust and apply Giroux’s critical framework to the situation in Haiti and argue that a “politics of disposability” has been operational. Departing from Giroux, I am interested in the ways in

---


14 See Giroux 2006, for a critical analysis of Hurricane Katrina.
which US national security measures contained any possible migratory movements out of Haiti as well as the ways in which Haitian sovereignty has been completely undermined in the year following the tragedy. This, in and of itself, may be considered an exercise of biopower as distinct from biopolitics (Esposito, 2008, p. 15). According to Roberto Esposito, biopolitics, or “politics in the name of life” is sometimes conflated with “biopower” which refers to “life subjected to the command of politics” (Esposito, 2008, p. 15). This is not what Giroux does, preferring the term necropolitics derived from Achille Mbembe to discuss life negatively affected by politics—disposable life—and deploying the term biopower in relation to the operation of racialised and classed neoliberalism:

Given the increasing perilous state of the those who are poor and dispossessed in America, it is crucial to re-examine how biopower functions within global neoliberalism and the simultaneous rise of security states organised around cultural (and racial) homogeneity. This task is made all the more urgent by the destruction, politics, and death that followed Hurricane Katrina (Giroux, 2006, p. 182, my emphasis).

Giroux’s inclusion of security states defined here as enforcing a “cultural (and racial) homogeneity” is a useful way to frame the response of the US to the Haitian earthquake, and ties in with Deudney’s argument concerning nationalism. The security apparatus around migration in the US-Caribbean region has been developing since the 1980s, increasingly reinforcing national sovereignty and the right to protect its borders, and culminating in Operation Vigilant Sentry introduced in 2007:

this plan provides guidance for four, broad mass-migration activities: (1) at sea rescue and interdiction operations in response to a mass migration from Cuba, Haiti, or other Caribbean nations; (2) deterrence and dissuasion; 3) land-based-law enforcement operations; and (4) migrant processing, protection, and detention procedures (Homeland Security Fact Sheet, 2007).

Deepa Fernandes argues that Haitians in particular have been “disproportionately targeted” by US immigration and homeland security measures (Fernandes, 2007, p. 123). For instance, Fernandes brings our attention to the automatic denial and deportation of Haitians arriving by boat while historically refugees from neighbouring nations like Cuba are provided the opportunity to apply for asylum (Fernandes, 2007, p.
133), a point overturned with the passage of Vigilant Sentry. That Haitians occupy a particular place as a security threat in the US imaginary is highlighted by two things in particular. Firstly, it was in 1972 with the arrival of Haitians fleeing political violence that indefinite detention was introduced, and secondly, the US government’s funding of the Haitian Coast Guard (Fernandes, 2007, p.135-138). It is against this background that the response to the 2010 earthquake must be read.

On 12 January 2010, an earthquake of 7.0 magnitude struck the small island state of Haiti leaving its major city, Port-au-Prince, in ruin and resulting in the death of 300,000 locals. The response of the US government was swift and significant, with a massive deployment of military personnel issued within hours; “one of the globe’s biggest warships” in addition to 10,000 troops (Thompson, 2010). In the words of Times journalist Mark Thompson, “Haiti for all intents and purposes, became the 51st [American] State...[or] ward of the state” (Thompson, 2010). While this is certainly true in terms of the liberties the US government took with Haitian state sovereignty, the US government did not extend all of the benefits of US citizenship to Haitian victims of the earthquake. Thompson’s language is of import here: to become a ward of the state is to be placed under the state’s care, to be regarded as unfit to govern oneself, a condition usually placed upon minors who are deemed to no longer have adequate parental supervision. This move has been discussed with reference to colonisation across a range of contexts, with designated populations being under the control of the coloniser’s law while not offered citizenship. That the US sought to dominate aid and, later, reconstruction efforts, undermines the political independence of Haiti, the ‘first black republic’ in the world (overthrowing its French colonisers in the late 18th/early 19th century). Repeating the phrase “Only the U.S. Military” throughout the second half of the article, Thompson’s nationalist piece gives the impression that the US government has taken on the responsibility of a Big Brother, compassionately pouring resources into the vulnerable region, taking the lead—even outnumbering the international community efforts with only 9,000 UN peacekeepers initially sent out (Thompson, 2010).

The actions of the US government to this natural disaster were, from the outset, framed in terms of national security even as they sought to provide essential aid. The use of such a paradigm for an environmental

---

15 The Haitian population is approximately 10 million.
16 The US government did provide temporary rights to undocumented Haitians in the US at the time of the disaster, but this ended in February 2011 when the US started deporting 4,000 undocumented Haitian immigrants back to Haiti.
catastrophe makes it a relevant example for more speculative discussions of climate security and migration to the Global North. The US government did not make any secret of its security imperatives, immediately deploying its national security team led by Deputy National Security Adviser, Denis McDonough (Thompson, 2010). The US gained air traffic control at the major airport in Port-au-Prince, regulating the arrival of aid and international personnel and, perhaps equally importantly, who could leave Haiti (AFP, 2010). The impact of this was heavily scrutinised in the media when a group of critically ill patients scheduled to be flying out of Haiti to Florida for immediate care, were delayed treatment for four days (Padgett, 2010). It has been reported that the majority of US money was spent on military endeavours with only a small amount allocated to the Haitian government to spend on food for its displaced population (which exceeded one million in the capital city). Haitian President Rene Preval’s comments were paraphrased by Democracy Now! journalist in the following manner: “his government is receiving less than a penny for each dollar the US spends on aid efforts in Haiti. Thirty-three cents of every dollar goes to US military aid, over three times the nine cents spent on food” (Democracy Now!, 2010). Aid and defence worked hand in hand with a large Navy hospital anchored off the coast of Haiti. Thus, in addition to securing the right to control the airport, the US government’s deployment of a Navy hospital in conjunction with Coast Guard worked to prevent passages across the sea to Miami, only 681 miles away from the small island. The show of force was clear: US Coast Guard Commander Christopher O’Neal saying that “The goal is to interdict them at sea and repatriate them” conforming to the directives of Operation Vigilant Sentry outlined above (cited in Rezouni, 2010, p.12; Waterfield, 2010). Salaheddine Rezouni has noted that immediately following the earthquake, “US soldiers in Guantanamo Bay have already set up tents and beds as a prudent measure to prepare for possible refugees” (Rezouni, 2010, p. 12). Thus, Guantanamo Bay, a site of exception from US law whilst firmly under its jurisdiction, would function as an ad hoc emergency detention camp in the event of mass migration. This provision had been initiated in the early 1990s by George Bush Senior, who set up Guantanamo Bay for use “as a refugee camp exclusively for Haitians” (Fernandes, 2007, p. 136).

If we are to understand biopower as the subjugation of life to the demands of political power, in this instance a foreign sovereign force has effectively sought control over movement of bodies out of another sovereign territory, as well as blocking off the avenues for migration across the
The decision to intervene in Haiti and assume a degree of sovereign right perhaps signals a changing conception of sovereignty in the era of climate change and natural catastrophe. Such changes are not geared toward recognising interdependence and forming cooperative forms of responsible action or “shared identity”, a movement toward globalism (Matthews, 1989, p.175); rather this example illustrates the vulnerability of another’s state sovereignty in the interests of US national security and US biopower. This occurred under the seemingly more ethical umbrella of humanitarian aid, but it is useful to recall Deudney’s warning that “taken to the absurd extreme—as national security threat sometimes are—seeing environmental degradation in a neighbouring country as a national security threat could trigger various types of interventions, a new imperialism of the strong against the weak” (Deudney, 1990, p. 468). Writing twenty years ago, Deudney’s fear can be seen unfolding in Haiti at least, most explicitly, until the US military withdrew in late April 2010 and, implicitly, in the internationally organised reconstruction process which has followed. Haitian writer and activist Jean Saint-Vil argues that this reconstruction effort is “mobilizing resources to maintain the status quo” with all but two of the construction contracts given to US contractors (Democracy Now!, 2011).

Against this sort of response “[f]or those countries already dealing with large influxes of migrants, and for those likely to receive increasing numbers of migrants as a consequence of climate change, forward looking assessments and forward planning for climate immigrants should be a policy priority” (Barnett, 2003, p. 12).

**MOVING BEYOND SECURITY: HOSPITALITY AND THE CLIMATE-MIGRANT/REFUGEE**

Following the devastation in Haiti, a gesture of hospitality shone through the wreckage and systematic organised violence of US national security. Amidst the blurring of humanitarianism and militarism and the firm commitment to US power, the President of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, offered land to Haitian victims: “The repeated calamities that befall Haiti prompt me to propose a radical solution: to take measures to create somewhere in Africa, the conditions for Haitians to return”. Such a gesture of goodwill recognised an historical context of colonialism and slavery: “They did not choose to go to that island. It is our duty to recognise their right to come back to the land of their ancestors” (ABC, 2010). More than this, on offer was fertile land, to ensure the sustainability of any potential community. While there was no mass permanent migration from Haiti to Senegal, by October 2010, 163 Haitian students had been granted full
scholarships to study in Senegal. Even this gesture is exceptional given the economic backdrop in Senegal where half the population is unemployed and literacy rates remain low (39.3%). In a speech to the students, President Wade invoked the language of hospitality: “Your ancestors left here by physical force...You have returned through moral force... You are neither strangers nor refugees. You are members of our family” (cited in Bojang, 2010). This message was reinforced by Iba Der Thaim, Vice-President of Senegal’s national assembly, when he spoke of giving the world “a lesson in humanity”: “Senegal has shown that it’s in the hearts of the poor that you can find the gift of generosity...A country that is neither rich nor developed has agreed to share the little it has with its brothers” (cited in Bojang 2010). While both officials deploy the language of brotherhood and familial ties, thus “introducing the circles of conditionality” (Derrida, 2000a, p. 8), it was under the dominance of security discourse that this act of radical hospitality was put forward. I call this gesture radical because it goes beyond determined rights and responsibilities and speaks to the particularities of the situation. What are the solutions, radical or otherwise, that we in the Global North, are willing to put forward? In the Global North, it is necessary to re-think our conditional modes of hospitality (as well as our inhospitable responses) and learn to more ethically adapt to the unconditionality of hospitality.

While it may read strangely to say that we must prepare for what we cannot know in advance, for the unexpected, this is precisely what much action in the realm of climate change requires. In so doing, there is an ethical necessity to move beyond the notion of security. While some have pointed out that the constructed nature of the discourse gives it the capacity to work in the name of progressive outcomes (see Trombetta (2008) for instance, as well as the acceptance of the term ‘human security’), others have argued that the term is irredeemable (Neocleous, 2008). Trombetta’s claim that “[s]ecuritization is not about applying a fixed meaning of security as exceptionality that inscribes enemies in a context... it is ‘an always (situated and iterative) process’ [citing Stritzel, 2007, 366] of generating meaning” (Trombetta, 2008, p. 591), is correct. However, introducing hospitality as the lens through which we should plan for movements of people holds moral appeal and seeks to short-circuit dominant security discourse. While security is discursively maintained, the dominance of militarisation in the realm of migration is evident in the ways in which many privileged nation-states are deploying deterrence techniques.

---

As we have seen, in the context of climate change Paul Smith acknowledges the need to move beyond the security paradigm and in the direction of morally defensible positions, while Jef Huysmans’ analysis of migration demands that we rethink our understandings of the political, security and the relationship between the two. Dalby also argues that a shift away from “exceptional measures” and toward “routine political and economic” procedures is important in de-securitising a range of issues (Dalby, 2006, p. 10). Barnett and Tacoli both state the need to include mobility as part of any solution to climate-induced migration. However, such dispositions are not available from within the logic of militarisation which inherently requires the violent closure of the border and thus denies the question of ethics or a more pluralistic notion of politics (Huysmans, 2006, p. 127). Nor, I would argue, are they available within the discourse of security even if it does not automatically infer the use of the military. Because security produces “a practice of exclusion: a practice of identity and being through exclusion” (Burke, 2008, p. 5), the logic that motors policy and discourse around (national) security perpetuates a form of identity that is separate from the ‘other’ or, when pushed, views alterity as a threat to selfhood/statehood. A politics of (in)security assumes that a fully protected state can be realised through force, and the re-establishment of borders, something pursued under the rubric of national security. The need to root sovereignty in forms of national securitisation denies what Butler thinks of as a pre-existing interdependency and vulnerability, “an impressionability and violability that are ineradicable dimension of human dependency and sociality” (Butler, 2004, p. xiv).

As noted above, hospitality is a double law, requiring the movement between the unconditional and the conditional. This movement is deconstructive in the sense that rather than taking an either/or position, hospitality arises out of the negotiation of the two poles. This process is also bound up with the construction of subjectivity and statehood. Hospitality involves the negotiation rather than reconsolidation of identity. As Derrida writes it is “the foreigner...the one who, putting the first question, puts me in question” (Derrida, 2000b, p. 3). Why is this significant? Returning to Burke, we saw that security imposes a mode of identity premised upon exclusion. Deconstructive reasoning challenges the possibility of discrete identities by emphasising the interdependent relationship between self/other, host/guest and so on. For Derrida, the performance of hospitality is not merely the reiteration of the categories of host and guest, but demonstrates how they rely upon and challenge
one another. In this way, notions of interdependency and sociality are compatible with deconstructive engagements with hospitality and provide a theoretical foundation for ethically informed practice.

I opened this paper with a quote from Derrida which suggests that hospitality contains an inherent riskiness and incalculability. This has two central implications for proposing a political vocabulary of hospitality in the context of climate-migration. Firstly, the acknowledgement of risk as something needing recognition could potentially be read as re-imposing the language of security, or justifying its presence (security is, after all, one strategy for eliminating or reducing potential risks). This raises the following questions: outside of security measures how can risk be responded to ethically? Does hospitality as a conceptual alternative provide a way to take account of risk without returning us to a political space of threat and danger, characteristic of securitisation? It is at this critical intersection that further work is needed, work which exceeds the scope of this paper.

Secondly, in spite of every effort to calculate and prepare in advance, the incalculable remains. What this means is that even if we create protocols and legal frameworks of recognition, something will remain excessive to these measures and disrupt them. In this sense, Derrida’s double law gives space for hospitality outside of legal imperatives. The implication for our concern is that the currently undefined nature of climate migration should not result in a default defensive reaction; rather, it is a chance for hospitality. This philosophical reorientation is where a new discussion of practices of hospitality can be generated, where perhaps we can “reorient the politics of the state” (Derrida, 2001, p. 4).

Jon Barnett’s argument, captured in the other quote opening this paper, suggests that we shift away from a military-sovereignty response to a foreign policy-global commons framework. This may provide us with a starting point for such a reorientation and is certainly compatible with the concept of hospitality. However, in order to avoid the exclusionary logic of security, this would need to renegotiate the binary relations of ‘us’ and ‘them’ or ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ and ‘host’ and ‘guest’ which tend to underpin foreign policy considerations. It is precisely by privileging a deconstructive language of hospitality that this may be achieved. In the domain of migration, this would require co-operative action and equitable responsibility-sharing at the level of programs, as well as rethinking concepts of identity and belonging at a conceptual level. It is here that the theoretical approach of a global commons discourse may be useful in conjunction with discourses of hospitality. If global commons regards
ownership, sovereignty and responsibility in ways that stretch the dominant western tradition, understandings of host and guest and of citizen and foreigner may be able to be rethought.

CONCLUSION

Despite efforts to expand the security discourse beyond the state and to mark it as constructed, the “national referent dominates discussions of security” (Barnett, 2003, p. 2). If national security inherently excludes the concerns of non-citizens by privileging national priorities, the protection of citizen rights and the “classic national security burden—ensuring its territorial inviolability” (Romm, 1993, p. 4), I have asked if it is the most appropriate paradigm to utilise in response to climate-induced migration. My critical intervention is not an attempt to argue for the dissolution of the state in the name of a world of open borders. Rather it seeks to highlight limitations and point toward the importance of ethical models that might help re-orient the response of privileged states to climate-induced displacement and migration. If our critical work has to take place within the context of nation-states, then it needs to imagine ethical solutions to major problems. Part of this will involve making more central the language of hospitality. As such, this paper has offered a review of the dominant security literature and its inclusion of the environment, climate change and migration. From here, I sought to unpack and scrutinise the implications of tying climate-migration to a security paradigm. In response to the limitations of this coupling, I introduced the concept of hospitality, drawing particularly on Jacques Derrida’s interventions.

REFERENCES


Uniting Struggles: Critical Social Research in Critical Times