ABSTRACT: This article focuses on the neoliberalization of higher education in Turkey. Our analysis is based on the historico-political dynamics of the state-academy-free market nexus in post-1980s Turkey. The paper relies on two layers of analysis. First, we focus on the regulatory mechanisms that have eased the neoliberalization of higher education. We analyze the legal regulations, and mainly the Law on Higher Education and related amendments that have been carried out to restructure the higher education system. The second layer of our analysis concerns academia itself and how the neoliberalization process has been perceived, internalized or opposed from within academia via ethnographic data gathering techniques (e.g. participant observations, in-depth interviews and field notes). Here, we focus on those academics who have been actively involved in the implementation of the Bologna Process in the universities of Turkey. Relying on field data, we argue that the Bologna Process is the most recent example of neoliberalizing education in Turkey that has included authoritarianism as an important asset and that has further fragmented academic work through both the internalization of neoliberal thought and alienation.

KEYWORDS: Turkey, Universities, Academia, Neoliberalization, Bologna Process

1 Simten Coşar (simcosar@gmail.com) is Professor of Political Science in the Faculty of Communication at Hacettepe University in Ankara, Turkey. Her areas of research include feminism, political thought and political parties in Turkey. She is co-editor (with Gamze Yücesan-Özdemir) of Silent Violence: Neoliberalism, Islamist Politics and the AKP Years in Turkey published by Red Quill Books.

2 Hakan Ergül (hkerгул@gmail.com) is Associate Professor of Communication Studies in the Faculty of Communication at Hacettepe University in Ankara, Turkey, and visiting researcher at Jacques Berque Center for Studies in Social Sciences and Humanities in Rabat, Morocco.
INTRODUCTION

This article aims at a critical analysis of the neoliberal reorganization of higher education in Turkey. It focuses on governmental practices and legal instruments that reorganize higher education, while at the same time bringing in field data related to the unfolding of the neoliberalization process from the accounts of the academics themselves. Our analysis is built on the historico-political dynamics of the state-academy-free market nexus in post-1980s Turkey. The period is especially important for understanding the present era since the institutional makeup and political frame for today's educational policies were introduced in the 1980s.

Post-1980s Turkey is characterized by the mark of the 1980 coup d'état and the following three-year long military regime (1980-1983), which is known to be the most violent of the three coup d'êats in the country's political history. The previous two took place in 1960 and 1971. The neoliberalization process was initiated almost simultaneously with the most recent coup d'état. The January 24, 1980 stabilization package is exemplary (seven months before the coup occurred) because it symbolized the start of Turkey’s integration with the neoliberal world economic order.\(^3\) The first among the economic packages that would unfold in the course of Turkey’s neoliberalization, the package hinted at the priorities of the new regime: stability and consensus in politics – that is to say, no structural opposition. It endorsed export-oriented policies, as opposed to the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) model of the previous two decades, and promoted foreign investment, in tandem with the emphasis on privatizing state-owned enterprises. Over the course of the 1980s, these three priorities coalesced and, at times, fluctuated as governments’ searched for popular support. 2001, however, was a turning point as the economic crisis cemented neoliberal orthodoxy. While serving as vice-president for the World Bank (WB), Kemal Derviş was unilaterally appointed to cabinet in order to implement policies that would ease the recession. Derviş’s economic program was retained by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), which came to power 2002.\(^4\)

\(^3\) January 24 Decisions symbolize a turning point in Turkey integration into the capitalist world system. The Decisions were supported by the IMF and World Bank. In the aftermath of the Decisions Turkey signed a three-year long standby agreement with the IMF.

\(^4\) We refer to neoliberalism as the reordering of the socio-political sphere in accordance with the prerequisites of the post-Fordist accumulation regime that is characterized by the preference for transnational commercial activity over production, and private investment at the expense of public investment (Harvey, 2005; 2003). In this sense, neoliberalism is also an ideological project intent on justifying this reordering of civil society.
There are two contesting views as to the last decade of Turkey under the AKP’s rule. The first is based on the assumption that the AKP’s terms in office signify a new era in the political history of the country due to the party’s Islamist origins and policy preferences. The second is based on the assumption that the AKP years in Turkey signify the closing of a period marked by the consolidation and crisis phase of neoliberalism. Our approach is informed by the latter argument (Coşar&Yücesan-Özdemir, 2012).

The article is built on two layers of analysis. First, we focus on the regulatory mechanisms that have facilitated the neoliberalization of higher education. We analyze mainly the Law on Higher Education (LHE) and related amendments that have been devised to restructure the higher education system. The second layer concerns how academia has been involved in and affected by neoliberal transformations in the universities. In our view, the Bologna Process (BP) is the most recent policy example of the state’s quest to implement neoliberal reforms. In order to ascertain academics’ reception of, positioning toward and involvement in the BP, we draw on multi-sited ethnographic research, including participant observation in everyday settings of the universities, interviews and field notes. It is our contention that academics have by and large been systematically excluded from policymaking decisions over the last three decades. In this article, we mainly focus on the data we derive from the semi-structured in-depth interviews. The interviews serve to explore the views and the first hand experiences of the academics responsible for the implementation of the BP action plans endorsed by their universities. Here, our aim is not only to enrich our analysis with emic perspective regarding the meaning the academics make of their own experiences related to the BP, but also to give them voice as they have been systematically excluded from policy making processes during the last three decades. In this we join Couldry (2014, 114) who reminds that “[t]here is no short-cut to understanding neoliberalism’s consequences for the people’s daily conditions of voice without listening to the stories people tell us about their lives.”

Our field research covers fifteen public and foundation/private universities, which were selected as a result of their historical, social, academic and regional significance in Turkey. Our discussion in the second half of

---

5 According to the Council of Higher Education “[t]here are two types of universities in Turkey, namely State and Non-profit Foundation Universities” (Higher Education System in Turkey http://www.yok.gov.tr/documents/10348274/10733291/TR'de+Yüksekgöretim+Sistemi2.pdf). This official discourse limits universities to “state” instead of “public” and does not point out to the commercial motivation behind the foundation universities. Indeed, since the introduction of the first foundation university in 1984, the higher education area has attracted considerable attention, transforming the field of education into a profitable and competitive business.
the article relies on an analysis of selected interviews, addressing interrelated issues such as the participants’ a) level of knowledge concerning the global/regional vision, educational policies and historical milestones of the BP; b) personal experiences during the implementation of the BP in their organizations; c) level of awareness about the criticisms of the BP and organized anti-BP movements in and outside Turkey; and d) personal views concerning the role of higher education and university in society. Participants are drawn from different academic and administrative positions, working for different public and foundation universities (Hacettepe University, Başkent University and TED University).

The literature on the neoliberalization of higher education in general and the BP in Turkey in particular has so far tended to unfold along three axes. First, there is a descriptive and sometimes affirmative literature (Reinalda, 2011; Yağcı, 2010; Dikkaya & Özyakışır, 2006; Kwiek, 2001). Second, there is a newly-emerging literature, which considers the transformations in academic knowledge production and definitions of science (Gibbons, et al., 1994; Hessels & van Lante, 2008). The third category offers a critical perspective, which considers the ways intersecting axes of oppression (e.g. race, class, gender) are further reinforced through the implementation of neoliberal policy objectives (Giroux, 2014; Soydan & Abali, 2014; Brown & Carasso, 2013; İnal & Akkaymak, 2012; Ercan & Korkusuz-Kurt, 2012; Stech, 2011; Fejes, 2008; Lorenz, 2006; Özbudun & Demirer, 2006; Hill, 2005; Olssen & Peters, 2005; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Peters, 2002). This article builds on the third axis by contributing to existing debates concerning the BP in Turkey. While there are examples for integrating the academics’ voices into the studies on the topics worldwide, though not many, (Knuuttila, 2013; Shapin, 2008; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997) in the Turkish context one cannot observe a study that combines historical perspective with the voices from the field.

The article is composed of three parts. In the first part we offer a critical reading of the legal regulations concerning higher education in post-1980 Turkey. The second part is reserved for the data, collected from the field. In the final part we discuss the current state of academia in the midst of the neoliberal crisis and the possibilities that it offers for resistance to the neoliberal structuration. We argue that the BP represents the fine-tuning between neoliberal educational policies and statist authoritarianism in the Turkish context as portrayed not only in institutional-legal terms, but also in the accounts of the academics themselves. The dominant discourse in the educational sphere supports our argument: it
is possible to observe repeated emphasis on notions associated with the BP in general. For example, there is constant reference to employability, lifelong learning and stakeholders’ weight in the educational design. Here, employability points to the dismissal with the right to work; lifelong learner signifies a parallel tendency to subordinate the principle of the right to lifelong employment. And finally, stakeholders’ imply students-as-consumers and market forces.

**HISTORICAL BACKDROP TO THE DE/ RE-POLITICIZATION OF THE UNIVERSITY**

The higher education system in Turkey has been going through intensive restructuring since the early 2000s. The roots of this restructuring should be traced in the overall socio-political restructuring process in the post-1980 period. The importance of higher education for the restructuring process is hinted at the LHE, which defined the Council of Higher Education (Yükseköğretim Kurulu, YÖK) as a constitutional organ in 1981, when Turkey was still ruled by a military regime. In the official discourse, the Council was justified on the grounds that the increase in the number of university students called for a standardized educational policy and administration. It was also claimed that a central body to oversee the university life in its totality would preempt the politicization of the university students and academics that marked the 1960s and 1970s (Tarihçe, n.d.) Thus, the official justification for the institutionalization of a centralized university structure was mainly based on the incapacity of the previous higher education system to offer solid grounds for coordination among different higher education institutions and to ensure a viable system of instruction due to high politicization. This, in turn, hampered the prospects for university autonomy.

University autonomy has been a persistent issue throughout the Republican era. The 1961 Constitution is important for it represents the first instance when universities were considered as constitutional organs and granted constitutional guarantee for autonomy. The 1970s, on the other hand, witnessed restrictions in terms of academic freedom. The justification was that the Constitution provided the grounds for extensive liberties leading to over-politicization among academic personnel and students, which was deemed to hamper routine university education. Thus, the 1971 amendments contained measures such as giving

---

6 A Higher Education Council had already been established in 1973, within the scope of the Law on Universities (No. 1750) to ensure State control over the universities (Dölen, 2010,114-115).
the Council of Ministers the authority to seize administrative power in the universities, and to dismiss academic personnel, as well as bringing in the Council of Higher Education and University Supervisory Board, which might be considered as the precedent of the YÖK. Though university autonomy was not eliminated with these amendments, it would not be inapt to point at the continuity between the 1971 measures and the overall restructuring process in the 1980s (Dölen, 2010).

In the larger picture, it can be argued that YÖK was designed to work in line with the coup spirit: instituting the structural prerequisites for the smooth working of neoliberal transformation in Turkey. This meant authoritarian measures for ensuring depoliticization among the populace, tuned with conservative cultural priorities. During the military regime the political opposition of the 1970s was silenced through bans on political parties, on the leaders and members of the political parties of the previous decade to participate in politics, and the wide scale arrests and imprisonments of the political activists from the left and the right. The dominant discourse of the period labeled any kind of political activism that carried the potential of opposition to the to-be-initiated neoliberal structuration, as marginal and/or extreme (read as threat to national security). While the political ground was secured vis-à-vis any socio-political opposition through the narrowing down of the political space, subsequent legal measures were enacted to prepare the legal framework for the new regime. In a nutshell, the military regime set the background to the initiation of neoliberal socio-political ordering, thus pointing the way to a synthesis between the national security discourse and democracy, understood in terms of free market economics. The most persistent assets in this synthesis have so far been a Turkish-Islamic synthesis – as the dominant form of Turkish nationalism in the post-1980 period – and the valorization of private initiative, free market individualism, as the sine-qua-non for liberty. All these assets can be observed in the current state discourse on higher education; thus, the repoliticization of the university. In other words, the universities are expected to stay within the boundaries of a conservative-nationalist discourse that is fine-tuned by neoliberal capitalism. Here, repoliticization also involves the state and its related institutions, acting as monitoring agencies over the universities.

---

7 Turkish-Islamic synthesis, developed by nationalist intellectuals in the early 1970s, and later appropriated by the ruling military cadres in the early 1980s, is based on the contention that “The best fit religion for the character and nature of the Turks is Islam. The Turks could not survive with other religions, those who tried, lost their identities” (Güvenç et.al., 1991, 50, quoted in Coşar, 2011, 166). For a detailed analysis of the restructuring of the educational sphere along Turkish-Islamic priorities see Kaplan, 2006.
Nationalism, colored with statism, has been a common asset in higher education legislation. Examples in this respect can be observed in the LHE, especially through the articles related to the aims and principles of higher education:

“educating the students as citizens who are committed to Atatürkist nationalism … who embrace the national, moral, human, spiritual and cultural values of the Turkish nation and who feel honored and happy for being Turk[s], who prioritize common benefit over individual benefit and who are filled with the love for the family, country and nation, who are aware of and habituate their duties and responsibilities toward the ...State ... [and who work for] ...the Turkish State with its indivisible integrity with the land and the nation... to [make it] a constructive, creative and noble partner to the contemporary civilization...” (Article 4, Law No. 2547)

This article sits in the same row with the priorities of critical thinking, scientific outlook and scientific research and accumulation of knowledge (Article 5, Law No. 2547). The coexistence of contradictory aims aside, the law also aims guaranteeing statist loyalties among the students and the academics, by including acting against the state interests into the list of deeds requiring disciplinary action (Yükseköğretim Kurumları, Yönetici, Öğretim Elemani ve Memurlar Disiplin Yönetmeliği, 1982; 2014). Such a contradictory juxtaposition of core values of the modern (European) university and the nationalist motifs within the same educational outlook leads to overemphasis on the latter at the expense of freedom of expression, democracy and human rights. It also delineates the discord with the principles of the BP, as envisaged in the communiqué of the BP 2020-Conference (2009), accepted by 46 countries, including Turkey:

“The aim is to ensure that higher education institutions have the necessary resources to continue to fulfill their full range of purposes such as preparing students for life as active citizens in a democratic society ... The necessary ongoing reform of higher education systems and policies will continue to be firmly embedded in the European values of institutional autonomy, academic freedom and social equity and will require full participation of students and staff.”

In line with its authoritarian nature, the law also foresees the risk of “blocking the instruction” as a disciplinary deed, which in the recent
governmental discourse has been posed as a *warning* against oppositional academics, especially with respect to their active involvement, mainly through unions, in opposing the AKP government. A similar style of *warning* can be observed in the YÖK President Gökhan Çetinsaya’s statements in the midst of Gezi Resistance that started at the end of May 2013 in İstanbul and spread throughout Turkey, which turned into wide-scale and mass-based opposition first against police violence and subsequently against the government. Briefly, while Çetinsaya emphasized the need for scientific responsibility rather than “daily comments” on socio-political developments, at the same time he indirectly labeled the academics supporting the Resistance and displaying critical stances toward the government for tending to (the discourse of) violence:

“First of all I shall note that the notions of university and violence can never coexist. In democratic and academic traditions everyone is free to express her/his opinions. But this freedom shall not go hand in hand with violence and nobody shall support violence. Those demands, which contain and which praise violence do not accord with the boundaries of academic freedom. The academics shall not approach the spheres of tension – in social, cultural, political issues – with partisanship. In this [Gezi] process we tried to preempt the blocking of education-instruction on the campuses.” (Interview with Çetinsaya, 2013).

When one considers YÖK’s structure and related legislation this perception of oppositional academics is not surprising. Although the legislation persisted throughout the decades under different governments from various political orientations, there have been certain amendments to the LHE. However, as İnsel (2003) notes, despite more than thirty changes in the Law over the same period, its essence has been kept intact. This can be observed in the resonance between the military discourse and YÖK’s disciplinary practices. At the symbolic level the resonance has been functional in the justification of the YÖK as a necessity for preempting the politicization of the universities, with negative reference to the 1970s. At the policy level it was reflected in

---

8 Here we should note that when the quotation is read in its constative form it tells little more than the YÖK President’s denial of violence. But when it is contextualized it is revealed that the President is referring to the academics, involved in and/or sympathetic to Gezi Resistance as perpetrators of violence.

9 The 1980 *coup d’état* has been justified by the same style, which contained the claim that the intervention was meant to give an end to the civil strife and political violence in the country due to the incapacity of the civilian bodies to govern.
the organization of YÖK’s structure as well as the “top-down, stage by stage authoritarian institutionalization of the higher educational structure” (İnsel, 2003, 76). Today, it is possible to note the continuity in this militaristic style in fulfilling the to-dos and/or getting things done in the adjustment of the university structure to the BP, as devised by the YÖK.

Alongside with the statist-nationalist authoritarian tunes in the LHE, it has been presented as a remedy to the rather scattered, inefficient working of the higher education system. While this style of justification hints at another feature of the YÖK system – the valorization of free market mentality in the sphere of education – it has so far served as a rationale for dissolving the autonomous structure of the universities.

Briefly, autonomy of the universities had long occupied the agenda of the governments in Turkey since the 1940s. The decisive turn came with the 1961 Constitution. According to Article 120 of the 1961 Constitution the universities were recognized as “…public corporate entities with administrative and financial autonomy…” (Dölen, 2010, 112). Yet the notion of autonomy was not formed with reference to academic freedom as a priority. On the contrary, while the academics were guaranteed job security by the Constitution via the provision that “the University bodies, staff and assistants cannot be dismissed from duty by the authorities outside the university” (Dölen, 2010, 112), the Law on Universities (No. 115, October 28, 1960) was preceded by the Law on Liquidation (No. 114, October 27, 1960), which formed the legal basis for the dismissal of 147 academics from their posts in the universities (Dölen, 2010, 189-190).

The 1971 military intervention by memorandum was, on the other hand, proclaimed to aim at correcting the 1961 Constitution so as to fit it to the socio-political dynamics in the country. The basic rationale of the military cadres was that the Constitution was too permissive for Turkey. The formula for the enactment of constitutional amendments was devised as forming “supra-parties governments.” Between 1971 and 1973 Turkey was ruled by four such governments, which passed laws that seriously curtailed the constitutional guarantees for basic rights and liberties (Aydın&Taşkın, 2014, 223-228). In parallel to the rationale that the 1961 Constitution brought in too much liberty to Turkey, Article 120 of the Constitution that concerned the universities was amended. Briefly, the 1971 amendments (Law No. 1488) enabled “the Council of Ministers

---

10 1961 Constitution was devised and enacted immediately after the first military coup d’état that Turkey had experienced in 1960.

11 Here, by “supra-parties governments” Aydin and Taşkın point at the coup discourse emphasizing the need for forming governments, which supposedly have no connections with the existing political parties (i.e. technocratic rule).
to suspend the university bodies and the academic personnel in case the liberties of the students and the right to education are endangered” (Dölen, 2010, 114).

Yet, the decisive cut would be introduced by the LHE of 1981. The post-1980 military regime followed the traditional pattern: The Law was shelved until the dismissal of selected academics was managed. In this case martial law (No. 1402) was put into effect in order to curb the university structures from the opponents, and mainly the leftists (Dölen, 2010, 194). The Law was enacted afterwards, in a rather neutralized political milieu. Unlike the 1971 amendments, the law contained no concern, provision, and/or article that opted for academic freedom and university autonomy: internal functioning of the universities was tied to the state organs; the election of the presidents, the deans, and the appointment of the department chairpersons were determined by the YÖK. Likewise, financial autonomy no longer meant the independence of the universities in deciding on the allocation of the state funds, which they received as public institutions within the frame of the right to education. Actually, the issue of university autonomy would arise merely with respect to the initiation of private education, and would take on a different meaning in terms of financial independence. Önal (2012, 131) notes that the introduction of a tuition system to higher education and providing the constitutional grounds for private education can be considered as the initial measures for the later dominance of a neoliberal frame in defining academic freedom. Private education at the higher education level was not constitutionally recognized until 1982. Article 130 of the 1982 Constitution recognized the right of the foundations to “establish higher education institutions on the condition that they do not seek profit” (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası, 1982.

The initiation of private education marked the reflection of the neoliberal structuration process in the educational sphere.12 Private higher education at the university level was managed through the foundation system.13 This enabled the emerging private universities to escape from the financial burdens of corporate establishment and functioning, since they have been considered as non-profit institutions, and more importantly to receive financial assistance from the

---

12 The first foundation university (Bilkent University, in Ankara, Turkey was founded in 1984, two years after the military cadres handed over governmental power to civilian political parties.

13 According to the related constitutional article (Article 43), “[i]nstitutions of higher education under the supervision and control of the state, can be established by foundations ... provided that they do not pursue lucrative aims” (Önal, 2012, 131).
state budget. More specifically, foundation universities, due to their non-profit institutional status are considered as legal public entities, they have the right to fix their tuition fees on their own; they receive financial support from the state; they have the right to dispose state-controlled lands; they enjoy the same right to tax exemption with the public universities (Soydan&Abali, 2014, 380; LHE, 1982; Vakıf Yükseköğretim Kurumları Yönetmenliği, 2005). The number of foundation universities rapidly increased in the coming decades, reaching sixty-five, compared to one-hundred and four public universities as of March 2014.

The neoliberalization process involved transformation on the plans about the structure, instruction/education and the academic profile in the universities. It can be argued that despite a brief period of autonomous university practice Turkey’s higher education system has worked through centralized oversight throughout the Republican era. By the turn in the 1980s the oversight was maintained through the LHE and the YÖK. YÖK’s function has so far been twofold. First, it ensures administrative control over the universities so as to preempt the emergence and/or effectiveness of oppositional political groups among the students and the faculty. Second, through the discourse on the need for standardization in scientific production, increasing the quality of education and the efficiency in academic work, it manages the infiltration of free market mentality into the university campuses. The disciplinary regulations for higher education institutions are instrumental to carry out such a task. The regulations are designed so as to depoliticize academic life, hinder political and/or social activism of the students and academics (most directly, unionization and strikes on campuses), with the disciplinary penalty of suspension from public service for the academics, and suspension from higher education for the students (Yükseköğretim Kurumları, Yönetici, Öğretim Elemanı ve Memurları Disiplin Yönetmeliği, 1982; 2014).

All these developments cannot be understood merely in terms of the political milieu of the 1980s. Neither one can satisfy with the analysis of the related legislation. For a more comprehensive analysis, one needs to inquire about the shifting dynamics of the neoliberalization process in Turkey throughout the three decades, which extend beyond the scope of this article. Yet we believe that the BP, which was added to Turkey’s neoliberal (education) agenda more recently, offers a snapshot in seeing the basics of neoliberalization in the educational sphere.
THE BP EXPERIENCE IN TURKEY

The BP was first initiated as an attempt to ameliorate the deteriorating higher educational system, which included increasing expenses and low employment rates of university graduates in Western Europe in the late 1990s. The first step was the Sorbonne Declaration (1998), emphasizing the need for a pan-European coordination for higher education, to be followed by the Bologna Declaration (1999), aiming for a European Higher Education Area (EHEA). The socio-political background to these declarations was shaped by the “shift in the structure of the international education market along neoliberal ideas” (Rienalda, 2011). The recurrent topics of concern in the related meetings, agreements, declarations are “citizens’ mobility,” “employability” (of the graduates), and economic utility (of higher education). The measures, adopted for standardizing higher education brought in a discursive set comprised of an emphasis on flexibility in teaching, flexibility in employment, measurability of the quality of the curriculum and accountability towards the stakeholders. In the BP frame flexibility in teaching is supposed to be achieved through lifelong learning (Güllüpinar and Gökalp, 2014), while flexibility in employment is supposed to rely on performance in terms of learning outcomes. However, it would not be apt to call the BP as essentially a neoliberal project (Reinalda, 2011).

Rather it involved the reformation of the higher education system in European countries, without leading to a “single Bologna model” (Yağcı, 2010, 588). Yet since it evolved within the neoliberal international context and proceeded to extend beyond the boundaries of European Union (EU), including such countries as Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, neoliberal socio-political priorities eventually penetrated into the higher educational reform. In this respect, the BP represents the shifts and relocations in the worldwide accumulation regime in the context of higher education systems. As Hartmann (2008, 217) argues, “what takes shape is a transatlantic norm-setting process,” signifying the flux in the centre of the global neoliberal order. In parallel, it would not be apt to argue that the BP in Turkey points at the hidden agenda of the global imperial actors and thus the government to impose neoliberal educational structure. Rather it is an integral part of the neoliberal order of things.

Turkey has been in the BP since 2001 within the context of its candidacy to the EU membership. The YÖK made it compulsory for the universities to take measures for the adjustment of the higher education system to the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) (Özgün, 2011).
YÖK has assumed the pivotal role in the adjustment process both as a supervision and coordination agent. It continues with its authoritarian style in getting things done, especially in the case of those universities, which are reluctant to consent to the process. In the process, the universities started (willingly or just technically, or both) to adjust their curricula to the ECTS. This process of a centralized body imposing a certain standardized scheme on the universities evolves through the YÖK’s extensive authorities over the universities, the most conspicuous one being the allotment of academic cadres. In line with this extensive authority, according to our field notes and the interview data, the BP in Turkey has so far been working regardless of the opposition that the academics might (or actually) raise against the related measures: The strategy of putting the required amendments as just technical issues on the one hand, and pointing at the risk that relations with the YÖK might (and most probably would) get tense on the other hand, exemplifies forging consent through authoritarian measures. Besides, the curricular adjustment also carries in itself a teaching and education mentality that is based on free market rationality. In this respect, the university-industry relation emerges as the key ingredient in YÖK’s discursive practices. Thus, the adoption to the ECTS is directly linked to a utilitarian approach, which calls for the assessment of the value of the knowledge produced and/or transmitted in terms of the utility it raises in the free market (Yüksekgözetim Kurulu, 2010). The most recent development in this regard is the new draft law on YÖK, which contains measures that would open academic work to the evaluation of the industry and government. Briefly, the draft law proposes the involvement of the Ministry of Science, Industry and Technology for approving academic research abroad (10 Maddede Yeni YÖK Yasası, 2014). In this

University-industry relation has been a long-standing priority of the neoliberal policymakers in the educational sphere. In this respect, the Law on the Development of Technology Zones (Date: June 26, 2011; No.: 4691), which forms the basis of the technoparks to be founded in the universities is telling. According to Article 1 of the Law the aim is “to produce technological knowledge, ensure innovation in the product and production methods, increase the quality or standard of the products, increase efficiency, decrease production costs, commercialize technological knowledge, support technology-intensive production and entrepreneurship, ensure the adjustment of small and medium-scaled enterprises to new and advanced technologies, creating investment opportunities in technology-intensive spheres in accordance with the decisions of the Science and Technology Higher Council, creating job opportunities to the qualified researchers, contributing to technology transfer and ensuring the technological infrastructure that would accelerate the flow of foreign capital to the country, which would offer high/advanced technology by enabling cooperation among the universities, research institutions and sectors of production in order to realize an internationally competitive and export-oriented industrial structure” (Teknoloji Bölgeleri Geliştirme Kanunu, 2001). (See Polat, 2013,170-171).
respect, the adjustment to the BP criteria works as a technical tool for the standardization of higher education. Briefly, Hartman’s point noted above regarding the BP as a “transatlantic norm-setting process”, hints at the use of the BP in the unfolding of the neoliberalization of education. The formula seems quite functional: authoritarian means at home, liberal claims abroad.

The utilitarian approach is further revealed in the discursive strategies employed during the adjustment process. Here, the manipulation of the principles of academic freedom, flexibility in teaching, student-centered instruction and autonomy in the courses is exemplary. Terms and concepts that are put in frequent use in the justification of the BP by the Council are helpful in understanding this manipulation: The terms shareholder/stakeholder, competition-quality and strategy are directly linked to the corporate discourse so as to lay the grounds for the designing of the courses according to free market dynamics and for opening the university education to corporate control. Terms like autonomy, accountability, transparency, quality, learning-centered education, flexibility in learning and lifelong learning are mainly presented as democratic and egalitarian credentials.

However, autonomy is considered as the ability of the universities to raise their own financial resources and the “strategy” to do so is already spelled out: making the industry a shareholder/stakeholder on the campuses. Academic autonomy as such, does not relate to academic freedom in terms of academics’ freedom of expression, research and teaching. Accountability and transparency are understood as making the universities open to outside control; “outside” meaning the free market forces. Quality is understood as the quantification of the teaching process, calculated in terms of students’ performances in the courses. Learning-centered education is presented as student-centered teaching, with a nod to democratic education philosophy; yet it ultimately connotes the compatibility between the teaching/learning (“learning outcomes”) and free market demands. Flexibility in learning is advertised as cross-cutting the strict disciplinary boundaries, and offering the grounds for multi-disciplinarity. In parallel, lifelong learning is presented as a means to keep the individuals sociable and “employable” throughout their...

---

15 The emphasis on quantification is most manifest in the guidelines for adjusting the course outlines to (what are deemed to be) the Bologna standards. In the guidelines that concern specifically the “learning outcomes” it is recommended to refrain from using such verbs as “knowing, understanding, getting acquainted with, being subject to, being informed about” since they are considered “ambiguous.” These terms are considered to fail to meet “measurability, observability and assessibility” of what the students learn for the market (Yüksekgöretim Kurulu, 2010, 28-29).
lives (MEB, 2009, 30). Both end up with referring to strategies for not educating but training the students into flexible labor force, making them employable, and not offering the grounds for employment (Güllüpinar and Gökalp, 2014). Also in this context not knowledge but information is considered as a yardstick for the social value of individuals. Here, the key term turns out to be measurability, in terms of cost-benefit analysis, on the basis of free-market demands.

**NEOLIBERALIZATION THROUGH COOPTATION: ACADEMIA AND THE BP**

The emphasis on measurability parallels the technicalization of the BP. While the YÖK presents the BP as a means for the improvement of higher education it does not get into dialogue with the universities, rather it declares the to-dos as technical matters. The same style can also be observed in the accounts of the academic personnel who are in charge of the coordination of the BP. In our research we were especially attentive to avoiding the risk of falling into the technicalities in order not to diverge our attention from the academics’ immediate experiences.

As noted at the outset, we conducted interviews in order to achieve the academics experiences regarding the BP, and make their concerns heard since the academics’ freedom of expression has been under increasing pressure during the last years. A most commonly used technique for such a dual purpose are semi-structured in-depth interviews (Hennink, Hutter and Bailey, 2011, 109). As a “knowledge-producing conversation” (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006, 128), it seeks to understand the meaning of respondent’s experience from her/his point of view without imposition (Spradley, 1979, 34); encouraging participants to tell their stories, with their own words and from their own perspective (Holstein and Gubrium, 2003); and penetrating “the defenses people put up to prevent their hidden beliefs from coming to light – defenses that they frequently are not conscious of” (Berger, 1998, 55).

The preliminary interview data encourages us to argue that the academics who are actively involved in the adjustment to the BP in the universities display limited awareness as to the historico-political dynamics of the process. When inquired about the fundamental drives promoting the process they respond with the standard BP designers’ and YÖK’s formula. Accordingly, the BP is adopted “in order to encourage the mobility of academics, students and the personnel in Europe.” For example, Dr. Defne,\(^\text{16}\) senior expert in educational measurement and

---

\(^{16}\) We use pseudonyms when referring to the interviewees.
evaluation, currently serving as a dean in one of the private universities responded to our question regarding the dominant conceptualization of higher education, university and knowledge production in the BP as follows: “Well, I don’t think the BP suggests anything new on that...All it says is ‘I want to expand the [EHEA]...And for this, I want to introduce certain standards for accreditation procedures.’ The BP doesn’t intervene in universities’ internal policies…” (Interview with Dr. Defne, 2014). This particular reply, ignoring the neoliberal background of the BP, its variation in different EU countries, and its implementation in Turkey through YÖK’s dictates matches the definition on the Council’s official webpage (Bologna Process in Turkey), thus reducing the process into a set of technical measures, while carefully disguising its free market dimension.

Aside from bypassing, there are instances when the academics themselves naturalize the authoritarian, top-down running of the BP. As Dr. Erol (Interview with Dr. Erol, 2014), vice-dean in charge of academic curricula and the BP in a foundation university, notes: “BP is an obligation for us...imposed by the YÖK. There are sanctions, certain official directives and instructions. Everybody must follow. We are talking about YÖK, the superior institution...Nobody has such luxury to say ‘we do not subscribe to this idea.’” The self-surrender that is well-tuned in this account also hints at the permeation of neoliberal approach as the *raison d’être* of the university-knowledge-academic responsibility nexus – that is, getting things done in order to keep your place in the university sector.

Dr. Deniz, who has been responsible for the implementation of the BP in a public university for seven years on the other hand, underlines the authoritarian-cum-technical working of the BP with a totally different concern, and thus in a totally different style (Interview with Dr. Deniz, 2014): “The unit in charge of the BP [in the university] regularly informs us about the procedures or deadlines via official announcements...with a very hierarchical, very patriarchal language...as if someone gives you an order [in the army]...‘those teams in charge of BP: you are requested to finish this and that by the deadline mentioned...’” Actually, all of these remarks give hints about the passivity, read in terms of the dismissal with autonomy and critical thinking, on the side of the universities. While Dr. Erol’s stance and similar stances might be considered as examples of the colonization of the academics’ imagination by the neoliberal educational policy preferences, it seems that others who are more critical...
about the process lack the means to challenge the process.\textsuperscript{18} “I think none of us was sufficiently informed about or aware of the bigger picture when we started to implement the system. The YÖK dictated us: ‘Here is the calendar you must follow… you are obliged to adjust your system by the deadline’” (Interview with Dr. Deniz, 2014).

So, as Dr. Defne notes (Interview with Dr. Defne, 2014): “I do not think the academics were given any chance to discuss the BP before it started to be implemented in Turkey. The process first arrived as something technical…We found ourselves in an incredibly heavy, bureaucratic burden of…adjusting the entire curricula to the new accreditation system until the deadlines. We didn’t even know why we were doing this at the time…and honestly speaking I think this is still the case today.” This top-down mentality is certainly prone to questioning not only by the outwardly critical academics but also by the more neutral ones too. As the Bologna Coordinator in her university who started the interview with her plain remark that the BP neither imposes sanctions nor dictates a new definition for academic activities, Dr. Defne, as the interview proceeded, revealed her suspicion about the effects of the process as “taking away the university from its authentic spirit; jeopardizing the basic values…such as freedom of allocating sufficient time, sufficient effort to your academic work; freedom of thought…” (Interview with Dr. Defne, 2014).

These quotations can be linked to what we noted as the overwhelming technicality in the discourse that surrounds the BP in Turkey, disguising the neoliberal-authoritarian synthesis in related educational policies. The dominance of technicality is also revealed in Dr. Deniz’s accounts. As one of the most well-informed and critical participants, she cannot escape from locating the cumbersome nature of bureaucratic details into the center of her account. Yet she, at the same time, acknowledges the alienating function of the contradiction between what she observes and thinks, and what she does (Interview with Dr. Deniz, 2014):

“I find the BP’s imagination of higher education and university environment quite problematic since the beginning. But then, for years, it’s…me who has been officially responsible…in our faculty, monitoring things that are completely against my understanding….such a schizophrenic way of existence…I have never been able to raise my

\textsuperscript{18} Similar tendencies can be observed in the EU countries. Reinalda (2011, p.4) notes that “despite the fact that teachers and staff have to implement the changes set in motion in their disciplines … the initiating Ministers of Education did not invite any professional or other organization of university staff to consultative membership.”
voice during the meetings once, and say something like ‘that is all ridiculous’…My thoughts, ideas, criticisms, political stance…all are parenthesized during such meetings.”

One might expect that such a critical stance, though silenced, calls for counter movements to the transformation process, as evidenced not only in Europe but also in the Latin American context against the “tuning project” (Aboites, 2010). Yet none of the participants are informed about the global counter movements, or as we observed in some cases, they are reluctant to share their personal opinions. Dr. Erol, in parallel to his approach to the whole transformation process and the Council’s role in it “googled” the words “Bologna Process, student protest” on his office PC, and then continued: “What do these people complain about? Cultural corruption? Imperialist influence? These are completely meaningless. It’s the EU who is giving you [the students, protesting] the money, not us…” (Interview with Dr. Erol, 2014).

Besides, it would be apt to note that the trade unions in the education sector have not yet taken the BP on their agendas as a particular issue. They have rather treated it through general opposition against neoliberalization, and thus have not developed specific strategies in order to counter the policies implemented gradually at each and every stage of the process.

CONCLUSION
Although the rhetorical packaging behind the neoliberal discourse manipulates respecting democratic values and diversity of voices and thoughts, the last decade of higher education in Turkey demonstrates that it operates through a collective performance of illusion of democracy and power of autocracy that values only the voices of the market, whereas the main voices and subjects in academia are keenly excluded. This is in line with Couldry’s (2014, 135) assertion that dominant discourses of neoliberalism, under the disguise of seemingly democratic values such as individual’s/consumer’s freedom of choice, does not value voice; in fact, it “denies the voice”. Looking at the last thirty years

---

19 This rather rough rationalization can be considered as a neoliberal mark on the academic mind, which Rhoades and Slaughter (2004, 37) name as “academic capitalism.” Although coined specifically with reference to the “marketization” of higher education in the US the term recalls what can be read in-between the lines of the documents on the BP in Turkey: “strategic decisions about the development, investment in and delivery of curriculum are being increasingly driven by short-term market considerations and made outside the purview of shared governance” (Ibid., 47); hence the dominance of utilitarian mentality.
of neoliberal policies in Britain, Couldry, who, together with McRobbie, had once announced “the death of the idea of the university” (2010), argues that “neoliberal democracy” is an oxymoron, responsible for the “social recession” that preceded the economic recession (2014, 2). By this, Couldry implies that the neoliberal mentality, working through the illusion of liberty and estimating all facets and the purpose of life in economic terms creates social decay. Academia is by no means immune to such social crises and recessions. As the rich critical literature testifies, through the policies promoting market-oriented solutions for persisting educational problems, positioning the academics as self-absorbed competitors instead of public intellectuals, and replacing academic/social values with commercial ones, neoliberalism has transformed not only the core of higher education around the world, but perhaps more significantly “how we think and what we do as teachers and learners” (Robertson, 2007, 11, italics in original). The state control over the universities in post-1980 Turkey has worked in a similar way. All the policies that have been gradually implemented throughout the three decades targeted the “subversive [nature of] the social and intellectual role of the university” (Chomsky quoted in Grioux, 2006, 65-66) and pacifying the “engaged public intellectual [who] must function within institutions, in part, as an exile, ‘whose place it is publicly to raise embarrassing questions, to confront orthodoxy and dogma...to refuse to be easily co-opted by governments or corporations’” (Said, quoted in Grioux, 2006, 73).

The BP can be considered as an example of this pacifying strategy. It is initiated, controlled and manipulated by the YÖK as the sole authority; the universities are forced directly or indirectly to adjust to the educational models, devised within the BP frame. And as the interview data suggest, academics –irrespective of their position vis-à-vis the BP – consider the recent transformations as another top-down intervention into the field of higher education. They tend to see the to-dos as part of their professional and administrative duties, willingly or not, but certainly with a high sense of responsibility to follow the instructions given by the university board or the YÖK; respect the deadlines

---

20 Couldry and McRobbie’s critical essay addresses the Browne Report, defining the higher education as a market where the services (education) are merely determined by student choice, and introducing “a system for distributing resources based on individual market choice” in order to “somehow generate the system that society needs” (2010, 3). Couldry borrows the concept “social recession” from Lawson (2007) who sees the free-marketization of every aspect of life as the source of major social crises in contemporary capitalist societies: “Neoliberalism promised a utopia but has failed to deliver (…) Working harder to keep up on the treadmill of the learn-to-earn consumer society is deepening our social recession.”

announced in a dutiful manner; and continue their everyday academic practices under given conditions. Perhaps the active involvement of academia awaits the finalization of the free-marketization of higher education – that is to say, the liquidation of critical academic groups, and the consolidation of the new specialist and technician cadres as the main actors in the universities.

REFERENCES


---

22 Although her ethnographic research deals with the new administrative policies and “managerialism” in academia, this resembles what Polster (2012, 115) argues in relation to Canadian universities: “[A]cademics are seeing and responding to these practices as isolated developments that interfere with or add to their work, rather than as reorganizers of social relations that fundamentally transform what academics do and are. As a result, their responses often serve to entrench and advance these practices’ harmful effects.”


Interview with Dr. Defne, female, working in a foundation university, Ankara, March 25, 2014.

Interview with Dr. Deniz, female, working in a public university, Ankara, March 22, 2014.

Interview with Dr. Erol, male, working in a foundation university, Ankara, March 12, 2014.

Interview with Dr. Sevgi, female, working in a public university, Ankara, March 21, 2014.


